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NOTES
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
I. INTRODUCTION
In this period of heavy income tax burdens, the quest for a means
whereby income may be redirected, commonly referred to as income-
splitting, has assumed great importance. This discussion concerns one
such device for redirecting income-the family partnership. Whether a
family partnership is the proper device in a given situation is not con-
sidered. A review of the present state of federal income tax law regard-
ing the validity of family partnerships is the sole aim.
Individuals carrying on a business enterprise in partnership form
are taxed only in their individual capacity, upon their distributive share
of the partnership's income.' The partnership itself is not taxed as a
separate entity, but is merely required to file an information return
(Form 1065) which discloses the amount of distributive shares of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, or credit allocated to each partner.2 Because
partnership income is taxed only to the individual partners, accompanied
by the progressive tax rate structure, income-splitting among members
of a family partnership recognized for federal income tax purposes re-
sults in a tax saving to the family unit. The greater the number of in-
dividuals or entities among which a given amount of income is divided,
the lower will be the average tax rate applicable and, consequently, the
lower the total tax liability on the income.3
The war years marked a rise in popularity of the family partnership
as an income-splitting device.4 Wartime increases in individual tax rates,
corporate income tax rates, and excess profits tax rates spotlighted the
tax advantages of using the family partnership to split income, thereby
retaining a larger amount of income in the family group.
Intra-family arrangements and transactions have always been closely
scrutinized to ascertain whether the transaction has substance as well as
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.6031-1(2) (1959).
3. See Mauritz v. Scofield, 206 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1953) (three brothers spread
60% of their business interests among ten trusts for their children, nieces, nephews, and
unmarried sisters. In fourteen years over $700,000 was shifted to 29 taxpayers).
4. Between 1939 and 1941 there were approximately 290,000 family partnerships in
America. By 1948, this number had grown to 930,000. 97 CONG. REc. 12147 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1951).
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form since opportunities abound for agreements between family members
to be subverted to tax avoidance purposes.' Family partnerships operate
under this general suspicion because the close kinship and mutual interest
of the purported partners create a tempting opportunity for the family
group to attempt to secure tax advantages by income-splitting through the
operation of a profitable business enterprise in the outward form of a
partnership, although it is not actually such in substance.
The joint return provisions added to the Code in 1948,6 whereby
husband and wife are permitted to split income by filing joint returns,
removed most of the tax-attractiveness of the family partnership device
for husband and wife.' However, family members other than husband
or wife can also be recognized as partners; for instance, minor children
and elder parents. It is in this context that the family partnership remains
a source of tax benefits.
The all-important inquiry is, under what conditions will a family
partnership be recognized for federal income tax purposes? By way of
preliminary precaution, it must be noted that there are no hard and fast
rules which, if followed, will ensure the desired results. To search for
certainty where none in fact exists is at best a fruitless endeavor. The
most that one can do is to be aware of the pertinent factors in determin-
ing validity and be certain that no pertinent factor is left unweighed.
II. DEvELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
The family partnership device is only one of a wide-ranging group
of income-splitting devices.' Reference must be made, therefore, to two
enduring principles of taxation applicable to all income-splitting devices:
5. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
7. While a married couple wuill rarely find any advantage in filing separate returns
because of the split income possibility, there are some notable exceptions where the filing
of separate returns may be advantageous tax-wise. For instance, the use of separate
returns permits both husband and wife to each use $1000 of capital loss against ordinary
income, whereas in a joint return, § 1211(b) limits the ag,_:regate deduction to only$1000. Also, in the case where one spouse has paid substantia[ medical expenses during
the taxable year, separate returns will reduce the "adjusted :,ross income" of the one
who paid the medical expenses and will result in a larger miical deduction. Finally,
§ 151 (e) (2) prevents either party to a joint return from beirg claimed as a dependent
by a third taxpayer. Thus, it may be preferable for some lov.-bracket taxpayers to file
separate returns, for instance, a married student who is supported by his father and
whose wife's adjusted gross income is $2000. Under the tax table of § 3 the tax on a
separate return on this amount is $175, on a joint return, $58. By filing a separate re-
turn and paying the higher tax, the father may receive a deduction for the son as a
dependent which is more valuable to the family unit because of the higher tax rate of
the father.
8. For a summary of these income-splitting devices avd their development, see
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means o z Revenue Revisions, 1947-
48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 866-74 (1947).
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(1) income attributable to personal services is taxable to the person whose
personal service earned it,9 and (2) income attributable to property is tax-
able to the person who owns the property.1" It is against the background
of these rules that the law of family partnerships has developed.
There are three landmarks-two judicial and one legislative-which
have been most important in shaping the law of family partnerships. The
family partnership device was before the Supreme Court for the first
time in 1946 in the companion cases of Commissioner v. Tower" and
Lusthamus v. Commissioner."2 Three years later the Court reconsidered
the family partnership device in Commissioner v. Culbertson." Finally,
Congress, being somewhat dissatisfied with certain aspects of the existing
state of family partnership law, gave its attention to the problem, cul-
minating in amendments to the 1939 Code. 4
A. The Law Prior to 195i: Tower, Lusthaus, and Cidbertson.
The increased popularity of the family partnership, due largely to
higher wartime tax rates, was accompanied by increased tax litigation in-
volving family partnerships.'3 These decisions reveal a considerable di-
versity of judicial opinion concerning the legal principles controlling the
use of the family partnership for tax purposes." To resolve some of the
confusion,' the Supreme Court, in 1946, agreed to give a full examina-
tion to the subject by hearing the companion Tower and Litsthaus cases.
The relevant facts in these cases were substantially the same: a husband
made a gift of capital to his wife and the donated capital was sought to
be made the basis of a partnership interest.' Yet, the lower courts in de-
ciding the two cases reached opposite results. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held in the Tower case'9 that the partnership should be
9. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
10. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
11. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
12. 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 191, 3797(a) (2).
15. For an indication of the increased litigation, see the tables and cases cited in
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 1947-
48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 945-46 (1947).
16. For a collection of these cases, see Paul, Parterships in Tax Avoidance, 13
GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 121 (1945).
17. 327 U.S. at 284.
18. Mr. Lusthaus gave his wife money which she used, together with personal
notes given to Mr. Lusthaus, to purchase an interest in the partnership. There was an
informal understanding that she would pay off the notes out of her share of the part-
nership income. Mr. Tower gave his wife shares in his controlled corporation pursuant
to a plan whereby the corporation was thereafter dissolved and Mrs. Tower contributed
her share of corporate assets to the partnership in exchange for a limited partnership
interest.
19. 148 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1945).
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recognized for tax purposes, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit denied recognition of the partnership in the L5Wiaus case.2" The Su-
preme Court held that neither partnership was entitled to recognition. 1
Thus, for the first time, the Supreme Court had considered the fam-
ily partnership problem and its opinions in the Tow r and Lusthaus cases
were closely scrutinized for rules which, if faithfully adhered to, would
guarantee satisfactory results. Many courts22 and writers" seized upon
the following portion of Mr. Justice Black's opinior in the Tower case as
the ratio decidendi of the 1946 decision:
. . . there can be no question that a wife and a husband may,
under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for
other, purposes. If she either invests capital originating with
her or substantially contributes to the control and management
of the business, or otherwise performs vital additional services
. . . she may be a partner.... "
Hence, the approach to the family partnership protlem, after the Tower
and Lusthaus decisions, was an inquiry into whether a purported partner
had contributed either of the essential elements to the partnership, i.e.,
"vital services" or "original capital" (capital originating with the ques-
tioned partner as opposed to capital acquired by gift from another
member of the partnership). Thus, in the absence of participation in the
management and control of the business or performance of other vital
services, this approach precluded the possibility of using capital which
had been the subject matter of a gift from another family member or
using a gift of a share of partnership assets as the sole basis of a part-
nership interest recognizable for tax purposes.2"
The Commisioner consistently took the position that "gift capital"
20. 149 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1945).
21. The Supreme Court reemphasized the economic reality test and stated that the
controlling issue was who actually owned the income. Determination of the income was
said to depend upon whether the parties really intended to carry on a business as a part-
nership. The Court scrutinized the facts in both cases and foand that no genuine com-
bination in partnership was ever intended and that the purported partnership accomplished
no alteration in the economic relation of husband and wife in regard to the income.
22. E.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1949); David L. Jennings,
10 T.C. 505 (1948); Robert L. Gray, 10 T.C. 590 (1948); Wade E. Moore, 7 T.C. 1250
(1946); Edwin F. Sandberg, 8 T.C. 423 (1947).
23. E.g., Jones, Family Partnwrships, Their Creation and Validity, 25 TAxEs 252
(1947) ; Gruneberg, Husband and Wife Partnerships, 26 TAXEs 703 (1948); Note,
Taxation-Husband and Wife-Family Partnerships as Income-Splitting Devices, 21
TuL. L. REV. 154 (1946).
24. 327 U.S. at 290.
25. The dual element test of "vital services" and "original capital" was an "either-
or" test-the existence of either of the elements was a sufficient basis for a valid
family partnership.
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could not be a valid basis for an interest in a family partnership, and the
objective tests, requiring a contribution of either "vital services" or
"original capital," continued to constitute the applicable family partner-
ship law until 1949. In that year the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
Culbertson case to give "further consideration [to] the family partner-
ship problem."2
In Culbertson the taxpayer's four sons had acquired partnership in-
terests in a cattle business by giving their father their note. This note
was subsequently satisfied in part by a gift from the father and in part
by proceeds of the partnership operation. During the tax years in ques-
tion, one son was in military service and tvo others were in school dur-
ing the winter months, working on the ranch only in the summer. The
Tax Court found that none of the sons had contributed "vital or manage-
ment services" or "original capital" to the business." The court acknowl-
edged that the presence of either of these elements was "deemed by the
Tower case essential to family partnership recognition for federal tax
purposes"" and refused to recognize the partnership for tax purposes.
Thus, the entire income from the cattle operations was taxed to the father.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and
the Commissioner carried the case to the Supreme Court. Thus, for a
second time the family partnership problem was before the Supreme
Court.
The Court held that the Tower decision had been misinterpreted by
considering a contribution of either "vital services" or "original capital"
as an essential requirement for membership in a family partnership. The
Court said that the real question was "whether, considering all the facts
.. .the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."2 The Culbert-
son decision thus replaced the objective standards of "vital services" and
"original capital" with a subjective inquiry into the intent with which the
parties had acted, this requisite intent to be gathered from objective mani-
festations. The Court, however, disclaimed any intention of modifying
or limiting its decision in the Tower case and pointed to the neglected por-
tion of the Tower opinion which set out the proper test of validity:
When the existence of an alleged partnership arrangement is
challenged . . . the question arises whether the partners really
and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying
26. 337 U.S. at 735.
27. 16 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 596 (1947).
28. Id. at 603.
29. 337 U.S. at 742.
688
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on business and sharing in the profits or losses . . . [and] we
see no reason why this general rule should not apply . . .where
the government challenges the existence of a partnership for
tax purposes.30
Contribution of "original capital" or "vital services" was relegated to
evidentiary status by the Culbertson decision and henceforth was to be
considered along with other evidence of intent.3
A most important aspect of the Culbertson decision was the Court's
careful attention to "gift capital." The Court pointed out that the Tower
decision "did not say that the donee of an intra-family gift could never
become a partner through investment of the capital in the family partner-
ship."32  The existence of the family relationship "is simply a warning
that things may not be what they seem" and "transactions between fam-
ily members will be carefully scrutinized" to determine whether the donee
partner acquired sufficient dominion and control over the transferred
property to influence the conduct of the partnership in the disposition of
its income and thus become a "true partner."3
B. Tie Law Since 195'.
Either courts were confused with the Culbertson holding or they
simply refused to apply it, for several cases decided immediately after
Culbertson held in practical effect that an intra-family gift of a partner-
ship interest, where the donee performs no vital or management services,
would not usually be a sufficient basis for a valid family partnership. 4
30. 327 U.S. at 286.
31. The Court conceded that the absence of a contribution of either "vital services"
or "original capital" places a heavy burden for showing the requisite intent. However,
this burden may be discharged by showing that, notwithstanding the absence of these
elements, other evidence exists from which the requisite intent and business purpose may
be determined. See Herman Feldman v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 17 (1950).
32. 337 U.S. at 745.
33. Id. at 746.
34. As stated by the Senate Committee on Finance in it. report accompanying the
1951 amendments [S. Rept. No. 781, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1951)]: "the frequency
with which the Tax Court, since the C dbertson decision, has h :ld invalid family partner-
ships based upon donation of capital, would seem to indicate that, although the opinions
often refer to 'intention,' 'business purpose,' 'reality,' and 'control,' they have in practical
effect reached results which suggest that an intra-family gift of a partnership interest,
where the donee performs no substantial services, will not usually be the basis of a valid
family partnership for tax purposes." Not all courts were confused, however. At least
one, in Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951), decided prior to the
1951 legislation, not only heeded the Culbertson mandate but atso sensed the direction in
which the wind was blowing. At 522 the court states that "membership in the immediate
family alone and without more is no ground for disregardin_ for income tax purposes
gifts of property made by a father to his children . .. the tc-,st to be applied in a case
of this kind is whether good faith, bona fide gifts were mace to the children. .. ."
For a box-score of the post-Cidbertson decisions, see Packel, The Next Inning of Family
Partnerships, 100 U. PA. L. PRay. 153, 155 (1951).
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Congress realized that the Culbertson decision was not providing the tax
treatment to partnership interests acquired by gift from a family member
to which Congress felt they were entitled.35 Primarily to insure compli-
ance with the basic tax principle that income attributable to property is
taxable to the owner of the property, and, consequently, that a gift of a
family partnership interest is to be respected for tax purposes where there
is a real transfer of ownership,36 in 1951 Congress adopted amend-
ments3" which were re-enacted without substantial change as section
704(e) of the 1954 Code.
Section 704 (e) (1) " provides that, for tax purposes, a person should
be recognized as a partner in a family partnership in which capital is a
substantial factor in the production of income, so long as he owns a capi-
tal interest in the partnership. Under this section, it is irrelevant how
the partnership interest was acquired."9
Thus, where section 704(e) applies, it effects a shift in emphasis
away from the Culbertson inquiry into the existence of a "good faith in-
tent" and "business purpose" to an inquiry into the reality of the donee's °
ownership of a capital interest."1
The regulations under section 704(e) are particularly detailed in
setting forth the factors the Commissioner (and probably the courts)
will consider in determining the bona fides of a transfer of a partner-
ship interest.12  More generally, the Senate Committee Report points out
35. "Although there is no basis under existing statutes for any different treatment
of partnership interest, some decisions in this field have ignored the principle that income
from property is to be taxed to the owner of the property." Senate Committee on
Finance Report, supra note 34, at 39.
36. "[T]o harmonize the rules governing interests in the so-called family partner-
ship with those generally applicable to other forms of property or business [is the pur-
pose of § 704(e)]. Two principles governing attribution of income have long been ac-
cepted as basic: (1) income from property is attributable to the owner of the property;
(2) income from personal services is attributable to the person rendering the services.
There is no reason for applying different principles to partnership income. If an in-
dividual makes a bona fide gift of real estate, or of corporate stock, the rent or dividend
income is taxable to the donee. Your committee's report makes it clear that, however
the owner of a partnership interest may have acquired such interest, the income is tax-
able to the owner, if he is the real owner." Senate Committee on Finance Report, supra
note 34, at 38. 1 il
37. Int Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 191, 3797(a) (2).
38. Section 704(e) (1) : "A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes
of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a ma-
terial income-producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or
gift from any other person."
39. See note 36 supra.
40. Under § 704(e), the purchase by one family member from another of a capital
interest in a partnership is treated as though the transfer were made by gift. Thus,
whether a family member acquires his partnership interest by purchase or gift, he is
referred to as a "donee." INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e) (3).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (1) (iii) (1956).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2) (1956).
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that in determining the bona fides of family partnerships, the same
standards apply as in determining the bona fides of other intra-family
transactions.13  It is apparent that the principles enunciated in Helvering
v. Clifford,"4 an analogous trust situation, are also relevant, especially
where the family partnership involves the use of the trust device for
minor children as partners.
Taken as a whole, the 1951 amendments, thougyh not intended as a
codification or restatement of existing law,4" restated basic tax principles
as they relate to family partnership interests created by gift. The legisla-
tion was, in effect, a congressional mandate to the Commissioner and
the courts to apply the basic tax principle that income earned by prop-
erty is taxable to the owner of the property, as long as the ownership is
real. The amendments also served notice that the established adminis-
trative rule-that transactions between family members which have the
effect of reducing taxes will be subjected to close scrutiny-should not
take precedence over the afore-mentioned tax principle concerning taxa-
tion of income attributable to property.
III. PRESENT CONSIDERATIONS IN EST.ABLISHING
A FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
A. Governing Principles.
The inquiry into the present requirements for establishing a valid
family partnership proceeds on two levels: (1) what principles govern
the recognition of family partnerships for income tax purposes, and
(2) what facts and circumstances are relevant ei identiary matters in
connection with the governing principles."
As previously pointed out, Congress, in 1951, established new prin-
ciples governing income tax recognition of family partnerships. The
statutory provisions, reenacted as section 704(e) of the 1954 Code, pro-
vide that, for taxable years beginning after Decembe r 31, 1950, a person
43. Senate Committee on Finance Report, supra note 34, at 39.
44. 309 U.S. 351 (1940). The Clifford principles are essentially to the effect that
where a person who has purportedly transferred property to another in practical effect
retains substantial dominion and control over the property, eithe2r under the terms of the
arrangement or by the circumstances upon its creation and op ration, the transferor re-
mains taxable on the income attributable to the property.
45. Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959).
46. Aside from the principles peculiarly applicable to faminly partnerships, other tax
principles must be complied with. The principle that income is taxable to the person
whose personal service or property earned it requires that any person seeking partner
status must establish a contribution of either capital or services to the partnership during
the taxable period in question. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739 (1949).
The taxpayer must also prove the existence of a partnership agreement, either expressed
in words or implied from conduct. 40 AM. Jum. PARTNERSHIPS § 18 (1942).
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shall be recognized as a partner if he owns a capital interest in a partner-
ship in which capital is a material income-producing factor." Section
704(e) initially raises the question of what types of partners and partner-
ships are entitled to the blanket recognition afforded by its provisions."
In so far as partners are concerned, section 704(e) applies only to
those who possess a "capital interest." A "capital interest" in a partner-
ship consists of an interest in the assets of the partnership which is dis-
tributable to the partner upon his withdrawal from the partnership or
upon liquidation of the partnership.49 A mere right to participate in the
earnings of a partnership does not constitute a "capital interest" within
the statutory meaning of the term."0
To prevent the deflection of personal service income to other family
members through the device of donated capital interests, section 704(e)
(1) logically requires that capital be a substantial income-producing fac-
tor in the partnership's business if a donee's status as a partner is based
solely upon ownership of partnership capital." Thus answering the pre-
vious inquiry of what type of partnerships are covered by section 704(e),
it is only those in which "capital is a material income-producing factor."
There is no single test to determine whether "capital is a material income-
producing factor" in a partnership. The determination is a factual in-
47. Generally the blanket recognition of family partnerships accorded under §
704(e) is favorable to the taxpayer, but it can be a two-way street for the taxpayer who
chooses to read the future in only one way and focuses only on tax minimization. In
some cases family partnerships have suffered losses and taxpayers, hoping to secure the
entire loss deduction, have reversed themselves claiming that the partnerships were not
real. Usually, however, courts have held the taxpayer of his election to do business as
a partnership. See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952) (a taxpayer
who established a partnership which was valid under state law, conducted business rep-
resenting the business as a partnership to the Government, filed partnership tax returns,
and obtained a tax benefit, cannot repudiate the partnership in order to obtain a tax
benefit for himself even though the partnership may, in fact, be unreal for income tax
purposes). While the taxpayer may be bound by his election to do business as a partner-
ship, the Government is not so bound.
48. The provisions of § 704(e) are ostensibly applicable to family partnerships
and one might infer that only family members are covered. This is not the case and
non-family members may be recognized as partners under the statutory provisions. For
instance, § 704(e) (1) states that "a person shall be recognized as a partner . . . if he
owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing
factor. . . ." This does not limit the recognition to family members. The court
in Pogetto v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 688, 689-90 (N.D. Cal. 1961) discussed this
aspect: "The so-called family partnership problem appears in partnerships not com-
posed exclusively of family members, and in this sense the term 'family partnership'
may be a misnomer. For example, . . . it is . . . clear that several members of the
partnership (considered herein) are not related to the Pogetto family. However, the
so-called family partnership provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are applicable."
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (1) (v) (1956).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (v) (1956). For a discussion of a mere right to
share in "going concern profits" as constituting a "capital interest," see Note, Family
Partnerships and the Revenue Act of i95i, 61 YALE L.J. 541, 546-47 (1952).
51. See Pogetto v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
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quiry in each individual case.12  Relevant considerations in this connec-
tion include: the total amount of partnership capitol, the nature of the
enterprise, the use made of the capital, the type of assets held by the
partnership, the portion of the partnership income attributable to personal
services as compared with the portion attributable to capital, the need of
the enterprise for capital, and consequently, the benefit to the enterprise
from invested capital, and other similar considerations."3 Normally
capital is considered a material income-producing factor if the operation
of the enterprise requires the maintenance of a substantial inventory or a
substantial investment in plant, machinery, or equipment. 4 On the other
hand, capital is not ordinarily a material income-producing factor where
the income of the business consists principally of fees, commissions, or
other compensation for personal services."5
Since the 1948 joint-return amendment" removed the tax incentive
for a husband to establish his wife as a partner, the family partnership
battles of the future will probably involve minor children or trustees for
minor children who will base their claim for status as a partner on do-
nated capital interests. Consequently, the statutory principles will prob-
ably govern most future family partnership transactions. However, in
those situations where section 704(e) is inapplicable-either because the
challenged partner does not own a "capital interest," there is no invested
capital or invested capital is a negligible income-producing factor, or the
taxable year involved is prior to January 1, 1951 7 -the Culbertson "in-
tent" criteria remains vital" and the taxpayer must prove that the chal-
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (iv) (1956).
53. Pogetto v. United States, 306 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1962) (partner not recognized
because her capital investment did not benefit the income-producing capacity of the
partnership business). In Greenburger v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir.
1949) the court stated that "the capital invested in the partnecship was not large, but
the point is that [the partners] decided it was sufficient for the needs of the busi-
ness. . . ." See, Pack-el, The Next Inning of Family Partnrirsips, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
153, 159 (1951). Cf. Charles M. Peisner, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 405 (1957) where the
court said it was enough to make capital an important income-producing factor that capi-
tal was required for the business to begin operation.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (iv) (1956).
55. Ibid.
56. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6013.
57. The statntory standard is only applicable to tax years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1950. The 1951 amendment states that "the determination as to whether a person
shall be recognized as a partner for income tax purposes for ary taxable year beginning
before January 1, 1951, shall be made as if this section had not been enacted and without
inferences drawn from the fact that this section is not expre,;sly made applicable with
respect to taxable years beginning before January 1, 1951." § 340(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1951.
SS. Under the Culbertson test attention is focused upon tie subjective question of
the bona fide intention of the parties to join together in the present conduct of the busi-
ness as a partnership. The requisite intent is to be gleaned from "the agreement, the
conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of
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lenged partner contributed to the production of partnership income in
some way other than by investment of capital, such as by rendering vital
services."
B. Relevant Evidentiary Matters.
Under the statutory standard of section 704(e), inquiry is directed
to the fact of "actual ownership" by the challenged partner of a capital
interest in the partnership.6" The heart of the issue is whether there has
been an absolute transfer of a capital interest and whether the donee
thereafter has dominion and control over the interest, or, conversely,
whether the donee's partnership interest represents a mere surface change
of ownership. The Commissioner has adopted regulations setting forth
factors for consideration in determining the reality for income tax pur-
poses of a donee's ownership of a partnership interest."'
Since the statutory standard became effective in 1951, there has been
relatively little litigation under its provisions. However, the cases that
have been decided and the regulations that have been adopted indicate
that, in determining whether a donee has acquired actual ownership, the
significant factors to consider include: (1) controls, both direct and in-
direct, which the donor has retained over the purportedly transferred
capital interest, (2) management participation by the donee, (3) actual
distribution to the donee of his share of partnership income, (4) conduct
of the partnership business, (5) documentary evidence, (6) motive and
business purpose for transferring a capital interest to the donee, and
(7) state law.
Two things should be kept in mind while reading the following dis-
cussion of these significant evidentiary factors. First, no one of the fac-
disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital
contributions, the actual control of the income and the purposes for which it is used, and
any other facts throwing light on . . . true intent." Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. 733, 742 (1949). The 1951 act left unchanged the proof needed to establish the
requisite intent. For decisions applying the Culbertson test, see P-H 1964 FED. TAX
SERv. 15,512-15,527. See generally, Bruton, Family Partnerships and the Income Tax-
The Culbertson Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REzv. 143 (1949) ; Guttdn and Beck, Culbertson
May Herald New Era in Family Partnerships, 88 J. AccoUNTANCY 121 (1949) ; Thrower,
Cielbertson-A Return to Normalcy in Family Partnerships, 12 GA. B.J. 7 (1949) ; Note,
Family Partnerships-Tower and Lusthaus Revisited, 18 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 372 (1950).
59. The relation between § 704(e) and the Culbertson test is illustrated in Pogetto
v. United States, 306 F.2d 76, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) where the court stated that the chal-
lenged partner "cannot be ignored as a partner . . . simply because [the taxpayers]
have failed to satisfy the objective standards of § 704(e) (1). In order to disregard[her] as a partner for income tax purposes, it must also appear that the parties did not
in good faith intend to join together as partners."
60. "Actual ownership," i.e., the type of ownership required by § 704(e), means
more than mere legal ownership. It means legal ownership plus dominion and control
over the property purportedly owned.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (i) (1956).
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tors standing alone will normally be conclusive. The existence of the
requisite ownership cannot be determined by isolated, circumstances tend-
ing one way or another, or by any formal or specific test. It must be
ascertained by weighing all the facts and circumstances of each particular
case.12 A second thing to keep in mind is that the following discussion
of significant factors applies to family partnership situations in general,
regardless of whether the partnership involves general or limited partners,
trusts and trustees, minor partners, or any other special situation.
1. Controls Retahed by the Donor Over the Transferred Interest.
Any partnership arrangement, even at arm's length, must necessarily in-
volve some restrictions which curtail each partner's dominion and control
over his partnership interest. Thus, not every restriction on the donee's
control of his partnership interest will be indicative of a lack of true
ownership in the donee." The issue where family partnerships are con-
cerned is whether the donor retains, directly or indirectly, so many of the
incidents customarily identified with ownership as to constitute a restric-
tion of ownership inconsistent with the normal relationships among part-
ners. The regulations list the following donor-retained controls as par-
ticularly significant indicia of a lack of real ownership in the donee:
determination of the distribution of partnership income, restrictions on
donee's withdrawal from the partnership, control of the donor of assets
essential to the business, and retention by the donior of management
powers inconsistent with the normal relationship between partners."
One of the customary incidents of ownership of a partnership in-
terest is the right to have some voice in the determination of when and
in what amounts partnership earnings will be distributed. Where such
determination rests solely within the donor's discretion, it tends to refute
the reality of the donee's ownership." It is not uncommon in ordinary
business relationships for partners to consent to accumulate earnings to
the extent that they are reasonably required for the anticipated needs of
the business and such an accumulation of earnings would ordinarily be
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (iii) (1956).
63. Senate Finance Committee Report, Sen. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 38
(1951): "Not every restriction upon complete and unfettered control 'by donee of the
property donated will be indicative of sham in the transaction. Contractual restrictions
may be of the character incident to the normal relationships araong partners. Substan-
tial powers may be retained by the transferor as a managing partner or in any other
fiduciary capacity which, when considered in the light of all the circumstances, will not
indicate any lack of true ownership in transferee. In weighing the effect of a retention
of any power upon the bona fides of a purported gift or sale, a power exercised for the
benefit of others must be distinguished from a power vested in transferor for his own
benefit."
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (d) (1956).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (ii) (a) (1956).
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considered a neutral factor."8 However, if the donor retains the right
to accumulate earnings beyond the reasonably anticipated needs of the
business, this would constitute a serious infringement upon the donee's
enjoyment of the benefits of ownership and weigh against a finding of
real ownership in the donee.
Another customary incident of ownership of a partnership interest is
the freedom to withdraw the interest from the partnership and sell or
otherwise dispose of the interest without financial detriment. In this
light, a partnership agreement which places withdrawal or disposition of
the donee's interest solely within the donor's discretion is indicative of a
lack of real ownership in the donee." Nor can it be said that a donee is
free to withdraw or dispose of his interest when he may do so only at a fi-
nancial loss as, for example, where the partnership agreement permits one
or more of the other partners to purchase the donee's interest for sub-
stantially less than its fair market value.68 Also, a ". . . donee shall not
be considered free to liquidate his interest unless, considering all the
facts, it is evident that the donee is independent of the donor and has
such maturity and understanding of his rights as to be capable of deciding
to exercise, and capable of exercising, his right to withdraw his capital
interest from the partnership." 9 It would seem however that some rea-
sonable restrictions on withdrawal do not indicate a lack of real owner-
ship in the donee, such as a requirement to give a reasonable notice to
other partners prior to withdrawal.
The regulations also recognize that if the donor retains control of
assets which are essential to the partnership business, he may manipulate
these in such a manner as to render the donee's ownership of a partner-
ship interest a mere sham."0 Such control of essential assets might, for
instance, take the form of a family gift-leaseback transaction with an
extremely restrictive lease.'
It is not uncommon in normal partnership arrangements for one
partner to be made managing partner or to be given majority voting con-
trol. Hence, retention by the donor of management power or voting
66. See Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (b) (1956). Compare Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31
P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962) (trustee-partner recognized where he could withdraw
at will) with Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958) (trustee-partner denied recognition
where he could withdraw only with grantor's consent).
68. See Ray R. Offord, Jr., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 871 (1961) (withdrawal of
interest possible only at a price likely to be less than fair market value).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (ii) (d) (1956).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (c) (1956).
71. Cf., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951).
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control, standing alone, is normally a neutral factor.72 This would seem
to be particularly true where the retained controls are hedged with safe-
guards to protect the donee, such as where the donor is operating under
a revocable power of appointment to manage or whcre the donee has the
right to continually investigate the management opieration and be furn-
ished with periodic management reports." On the other hand, retention
by the donor of such management powers as are not common in normal
business arrangements may militate against a finding of real ownership
in the donee. Such uncommon management powers are exemplified by
the previously discussed retention by the donor of complete discretion
over the donee's withdrawal from the partnership or over distribution of
partnership earnings. In addition, complete power in the donor to de-
termine liquidation or dissolution of the partnership is not common in a
normal partnership arrangement. 4 The danger of retaining uncommon
management powers is particularly acute where the retained powers are
coupled with restrictions upon the donee's right to withdraw his interest
from the partnership.75
2. Management Participation by Donee. While substantial manage-
ment participation by the donee is not essential under section 704(e), it
is strong evidence that the donee exercises dominion and control and is
a real owner of a capital interest.7 1 Such particip.tion does not neces-
sarily have to involve continuous management activity, but it does re-
quire the exercise of some independent judgment on major business de-
cisions.77  An occasional refusal to go along with the donor-partner
would be quite indicative of management participa.tion by the donee."
Such participation by the donee, to be of probatix e value, presupposes
some acquaintance with and interest in the operations of the particular
partnership business, as well as sufficient experience and maturity as
indicates a competence to grasp business problems.75
3. Distribution of Income to the Donee. Actual distribution to a
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (d) (1956). See Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261
(1959) (mere fact that trusts had minority voting position does not establish that donors
retained control over the interest) ; Charles M. Peisner, 26 P?-H Tax Ct. Memo 405
(1957) (donor reserved right to be in active charge of management). In Theodore D.
Stern, 15 T.C. 521 (1950) the court stated that "of themselves . . . these . . . provi-
sions giving [the donor] extensive [management] authority are not conclusive, for part-
nership affairs frequently are conducted by a managing partner who has such authority."
73. Charles M. Peisner, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 405 (1957).
74. See Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (d) (1956); see Henry Reddig, 30 T.C.
1382 (1958).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iv) (1956).
77. Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962).
78. Cooper v. United States, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5728 (E.D. Wash. 1960).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iv) (1956).
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donee of all or a substantial portion of his share of partnership income
is a factor of substantial weight tending to evidence the reality of the
donee's ownership of an interest,"0 provided that the donee actually en-
joys the benefits of the distribution.81 On the other hand, if the distribu-
tions are subject to the donor's control or are used for the donor's benefit,
this would indicate a lack of real ownership in the donee."
4. Conduct of the Partnership Business. Meticulous conduct of
the partnership business in a manner wholly consistent with, and in no
material respect different than, customary practices followed in normal
partnerships composed of unrelated persons is a persuasive factor indica-
tive of the reality of the donee's interest, provided there are not also
present other more persuasive circumstances indicating that the donor
has retained substantial ownership of the interest purportedly trans-
ferred. s3 In this connection, a factor of primary significance is publicly
holding out the donee as a partner in normal business operations.84 Other
factors of significance favorable to a finding of real ownership in the
donee include: conduct of the business in strict conformity with the let-
ter and spirit of trust instruments and partnership agreements ;" estab-
lishment of separate capital and drawing accounts in the donee's name on
the partnership books ;6 recognition of the donee in the filing of fiduciary
and partnership tax returns;" compliance with local partnership, ficti-
80. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(e) (2) (v) and (vii) (1956). In the following cases the
court specifically considered the fact of actual distribution of partnership income: Jack
Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959); Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962);
James N. Bennett, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 991 (1962); Charles M. Peisner, 27 P-H
Tax Ct. Memo 405 (1957).
81. Cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 747 (1949) ("whether [a donee]
is free to, and does, enjoy the fruits of the partnership is strongly indicative of the reality
of his participation in the enterprise.").
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (v) (1956).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (vi) (1956); Finlen v. Healy, 187 F. Supp. 434,
438 (D. Mont. 1960).
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (vi) (1956); see, e.g., Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261
(1959) (partnership's bank, customers, creditors, and Dunn and Bradstreet were made
aware that partnership included trustee-partner).
85. See Peterson v. Gray, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5559 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Dickstein
v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Charles M. Peisner, 26 P-H Tax Ct.
Memo 405 (1957).
86. See Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962) ; James N. Bennett,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 991 (1962). However, mere establishment of distinct accounts
on partnership books is of little value if they are not respected in practice. In Henry S.
Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958), where the donee was not recognized for income tax pur-
poses, the court considered withdrawals by the donors in excess of the balance of their
capital accounts on the partnership's books as being a crucial factor.
87. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(e) (2) (vi) (e) and (f) (1956) ; see Jelindo A. Tiberti,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962) ; Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959); cf. Ray R. Of-
ford, Jr., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 871 (1961) (no partnership returns were filed thus
creating the presumption that no partnership in fact existed) ; see also, Cooper v.
United States, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5728 (E.D. Wash. 1960) (both state and federal
gift tax returns reported the fact of the gift).
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tious names, and business registration statutes; recognition of the
donee's interest in insurance policies, leases, and other business contracts,
and in litigation affecting the business."
5. Docianentary Evidence. Legally sufficient deeds, instruments
of gift, partnership agreements, trust instruments, and other types of
documentary evidence are relevant factors, but, standing alone, they can-
not establish the reality of ownership of an interest."° In connection with
both documentation and other formalistic factors previously adverted to,
it is basic to the application of the income tax laws that the Government
is not bound by appearances, but rather may inquire into the substance of
a situation."' Thus, while such factors are relevant and their absence
harmful, it would be folly to rest a case for recognition exclusively on
such evidence.
6. Motive. Under the statutory standard of section 704(e), the
motivation for making a donee a partner is accorded little weight as an
independently significant factor.92 If other factor3 establish the reality
of a donee's ownership, motive alone will not be a ground for not recog-
nizing the donee as a partner. However, motive remains one of the con-
siderations since it tends to color other significant factors. For instance,
while a tax-saving motive is not incompatible with the intention to create
a bona fide partnership, the presence of such a motive may be a tip-off
that things are not what they appear to be-that a taxpayer in an over-
zealous effort to save taxes has created an arrangement with all the ex-
ternal trappings of partnership, but without the accompanying intention
of carrying on the business as a bona fide partnership. On the other
hand, where there is an absence of a tax-saving motive or where there is
a business purpose for making a donee a partner, e g., where the donee's
skills are helpful in furtherance of the partnership business," there would
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vi) (a) (1956).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vi) (d) (1956).
90. Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959) (donee's ownership is not established by le-
gally sufficient instruments of partnership and gift) ; George L. Meffley, Sr., 26 P-H
Tax Ct. Memo 675 (1957) ; Pflugradt v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 379, 384 (E.D.
Wis. 1962) ("the bona fides of the purported ownership is not shown simply by the fact
that legally sufficient documents of transfer have been created .. ") ; cf. Eckhard v.
Commissioner, 18" F.2d 547, 550 (10th Cir. 1950) (absence of a formally executed part-
nership agreement is not fatal).
91. In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) the Supreme Court stated: "The
Government may look at actualities and upon determination tihat the form employed for
doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain
or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute."
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (x) (1956). If the ovnership of the donee is
real, it is immaterial what motivated the transfer or whether the partnership business
profited from the addition of the partner.
93. See G.A. Paul, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 640 (1957); Finlen v. Healy, 187 F.
Supp. 434 (D. Mont. 1960).
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be less reason to question what otherwise appears to be a bona fide part-
nership arrangement.
7. State Law. To a considerable extent, state law determines the
legal relationships of partners among themselves and with the public.
Thus, evidence that a transfer of property is complete and binding under
state law, conduct of the business in accordance with state law, and other
evidence of compliance with state law are factors to be considered in de-
termining the reality of ownership of an interest in a family partner-
ship. 4 However, recognition or non-recognition of family partnerships
under state law is in no way controlling for federal income tax purposes."
Nor will legal disabilities under state law which prevent a person from
becoming a partner prevent his recognition as a partner in a family part-
nership for federal income tax purposes." The non-binding effect of
state law results from the fact that the standards for determining the
federal income tax status of individuals and organization as partners and
partnerships are established by the Internal Revenue Code. 7
This discussion of relevant evidentiary matters such as retained con-
trols, income distribution, participation in management, etc., is not in-
tended to state comprehensively all the relevant factors applicable in the
determination of the reality of ownership, but rather is designed to em-
phasize the importance of these factors as evidence of the reality of the
donee's ownership. In establishing family partnerships in the future un-
der the statutory standard of section 704(e), one should, for the most
part, use the regulations promulgated and the cases decided under section
704(e) as a starting point. However, one cannot completely disregard
all that happened before 1951. In practice many of the considerations
used for determining the intent to form a partnership under the Culbert-
son "intent" test apply equally in determining reality of ownership under
the statutory standard. Also, one of the central issues under section
704(e) is whether a gift will be effective for income tax purposes. Thus,
the cases applying the Clifford principles are still important in the family
partnership area since these principles bear on the completeness of a gift
94. See Peterson v. Gray, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5559 (W.D. Ky. 1959) ; Spiesman
v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1958).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (i) (1956); Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d
412, 417 (5th Cir. 1962).
96. See Rev. Rul. 58-243, 1958-1 Cumt. BULL. 255; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2)
(viii) (1956).
97. Section 6031 of the Code requires that, with certain exceptions, any unincor-
porated organization, defined as a "partnership" for federal income tax purposes accord-
ing to § 761, must file a Form 1065 information return. The determination under § 761
of what constitutes a partnership is made without regard to state law. Thus an organi-
zation not a partnership under state law could still file a Form 1065.
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transfer of property."s
C. Minor Children and Trustees as Partners.
Recognition of minor children as the real owners of partnership in-
terests acquired through intra-family transfers is determined under the
same principles as are generally applied in determining whether any
family member is entitled to recognition as a partner for income tax
purposes. Determination of the reality of a minor's ownership of a
partnership interest resolves into an inquiry whether the particular child
possesses sufficient maturity and experience to indicate his competence
to manage his own property and participate in partnership activities in
accordance with his interest in partnership property.99 When a minor
child possesses the requisite maturity and experience to such an extent
that disinterested persons treat him as competent to enter into business
dealings and otherwise conduct his affairs on an equal footing with adults,
it is likely that he will be recognized as a partner in the family partner-
ship.1"' Ordinarily, however, in the absence of a clear showing of actual
competence, it is an extremely dangerous practice to make a minor child
a partner directly in the partnership without appointing an independent
fiduciary to manage the interest for the child's sole benefit.' This
warning stems from the fact that normally a minor child will lack the
competence to exercise the requisite dominion and control over his in-
terest as to result in recognition of him as a partner.
In addition to a minor child's customary immaturity and inexperi-
98. See also, Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519, 522-23 (10th Cir. 1951)
where the court addressed itself to the general proposition of effective gifts for income
tax purposes: "Ordinarily, the essential elements of a completed and effective gift for
income tax purposes are a donor competent to make the gift, a clear and unmistakable
intention on the part of the donor to make it, a donee capablk of accepting the gift, a
conveyance or transfer sufficient to vest legal title in the donee, without power of revo-
cation at the will of the donor, and delivery to the donee of thQ corpus of the gift or of
the most effectual means of commanding dominion of it. In order to be effective as a
gift, the donor must do everything reasonably permitted by tke nature of the property
and the circumstances of the transaction in parting with all in,:idences of ownership."
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (viii) (1956).
100. See Turner v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Arnold v. Green,
186 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Finlen v. Healy, 187 F. Supp. 434 (D. Mont. 1960) (limited
partner). In determining whether a minor child possesses the requisite competence, sig-
nificant factors to consider include: the child's education, actual work experience, the
degree of skill required to participate in the partnership business, and the child's age.
In Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962) the court quoted from the
district court opinion with approval: "[I]t is obvious that the four children, aged one to
three and one-half years, did not have sufficient maturity and competence to manage
their own property interests. .. ."
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (viii) (1956) states a presumption that a minor
child is controlled by others. See Pflugradt v. United State-, 201 F. Supp. 379, 383
(E.D. Wis. 1962) (Congress intended the interposition of a trust or judicial supervision
of some kind).
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ence, the question of participation directly in the partnership may be
further complicated by the minor child's legal disabilities under state law.
The Commissioner, however, will not press these legal disabilities so far
as to deny the competence of minors to control their property where the
circumstances indicate the existence of such competence in fact." 2
Since a minor child will ordinarily not be recognized as a partner in
his own behalf, it is usually necessary that his interest either be managed
by a judicially-supervised adult acting in a fiduciary capacity or be held
in trust and managed by a trustee."3 Where the minor's interest is man-
aged by a fiduciary other than a trustee, such person represents the child
in relation to the partnership and the child is considered to be the actual
partner. In such a situation, the minor child will be recognized as the
real owner of the interest only where the fiduciary manages the property
for the minor's sole benefit and where there is present such judicial su-
pervision of the fiduciary's conduct as is required by law." 4
The more common solution of the problems involved in transferring
partnership interests to minor children is to hold the minor's interest in
trust, establishing the trustee as the legal owner of the interest. In this
situation the trustee, rather than the minor, is considered to be the part-
ner. Where the interest is held in trust, the critical inquiry is again the
recurring one under the statutory standard of whether the trustee, in his
fiduciary capacity, is the real owner of the interest or whether the donor
has retained such dominion and control over the interest or control over
the trustee as to remain the substantial owner of the interest purportedly
transferred.' The reality of a trustee's ownership will be tested under
the same principles as are generally applied in determining whether any
family member is entitled to recognition as a partner for income tax
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (viii) (1956).
103. Use of either of these devices is sanctioned by the regulations. See Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.704-1 (e) (2) (vii) and (viii) (1956).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (viii) (1956). While guardianship is expressly
approved by the regulations, it is a cumbersome procedure and may not be too practical.
For a discussion of the considerations involved in using the guardianship device, see
Bennion, How to Split Income Through Family Partnerships, P-H TAx IDEAS REP. 111
13003, 13003.4(1).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (vii) (1956) ; see Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382
(1958) ; Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959) ; Roy C. Acuff, 33 T.C. 126 (1960) ; Harry
L. Bialock, 35 T.C. 649 (1961); Commissioner v. Brodhead, 18 T.C. 726 (1952). The
trustee was recognized as a partner in the following decisions which are not covered by
§ 704(e) : West v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Miller v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Pike v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956).
The decisions under § 704(e) indicate that some courts regard the statutory standard
as essentially declaratory of the requirements under the Culbertson decision. See Spies-
man v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382
(1958). Other courts, however, have considered the advent of the statutory rules as
warranting a re-examination of partnerships in which trusts had previously been re-
jected. See Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959).
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purposes.' Additionally, there are certain factors to consider which
are peculiar to the trust situation. For instance, selection of a proper
trustee will often weigh heavily in favor of the trustee being recognized
as a partner. The safest course in selection of a trustee is the appoint-
ment of someone who is unrelated to and completely independent of the
donor.1"7 The regulations provide that a trustee will ordinarily be recog-
nized as a partner if he is "unrelated to and independent of the grantor
.. participates as a partner and receives distribution of the income
distributable to the trust. . . .,,08
\Vhile the safest course is to choose an independent trustee, cases
may arise where, as a practical matter, the grantor may desire or be lim-
ited to choosing himself, his wife, his attorney, or some close business
associate or friend as trustee. Recognition of the trustee as a partner
has been accorded in such cases, provided the trvstee has fulfilled his
fiduciary duties.' There is, however, a great temptation in such cases
for the trustee to make decisions and to exercise his powers over the trust
with a primary interest in benefiting the grantor and not the trust bene-
ficiary. This great temptation to exercise fiduciary powers for the
grantor's benefit makes appointment of the grantor himself or someone
amenable to his will a dangerous practice inviting close scrutiny of the
transaction to determine whether the trustee is the real owner of the in-
terest in a fiduciary capacity.1 ' Three general aspects which are closely
scrutinized are: (1) provisions of the partnership agreement; (2) pro-
visions of the trust instrument; and (3) conduct of the parties to ascer-
tain whether the trustee has scrupulously adhered to the provisions of the
trust instrument."' In addition, two other specific factors which will be
given particular consideration are whether the trustee is held out as a
partner in dealings with customers and creditors and whether the trust's
share of partnership income, beyond that retained for the reasonably
anticipated needs of business, is distributed to the trust annually and
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956).
107. See Swinerton v. Smyth, 7 Am. Red. Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ; Cooper
v. United States, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5728 (E.D. Wash. 1960); Jelindo A. Tiberti,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1038 (1962). For suggestions in -,election of a trustee, see
Bennion, How to Split Income Through Family Partnershis, P-H TAX IDEAS REP.
1111 3003, 13003.4(3); Brown, Minors or Trusts as Members of Partnerships, 92 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 181, 182 (1953).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956).
109. See James N. Bennett, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 991 (1962); Dickstein v.
McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Charles M. Peisner, 26 P-H Tax Ct.
Memo 405 (1957) (close family friend as trustee).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956) ; see Herry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382
(1958) (business associate of donor not recognized as partner).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956).
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paid to or reinvested for the trust beneficiary.11
Although particularly true where no independent trustee is ap-
pointed, the provisions of the trust instrument will always be examined
to determine that the normal fiduciary obligations are imposed upon the
trustee and that no important controls over the partnership interest are
retained by the grantor."' Among the trust provisions which may be
considered as weighing in favor of recognition of a trustee as a partner
are the following: a provision specifically making the instrument ir-
revocable ;114 provisions authorizing the trustee to invest any or all of the
trust corpus as he sees fit,"5 including the power to completely refuse to
invest in the partnership and the power to withdraw a previous invest-
ment ;.16 and any other provisions which generally accord to the trustee
complete discretion in the administration of the trust."' On the other
hand, existence of any of the following provisions may indicate that the
trustee's ownership may be less than real: provisions which require or
merely permit any trust corpus or income or benefits thereto to revert
directly or indirectly to the donor ;..8 provisions generally reserving to the
donor powers of administration of the trust;.19 provisions generally re-
quiring that the trust corpus be invested in any particular manner, and
more especially requiring it to be invested in the partnership ;121 provi-
sions directing the trustee to act always in the best interests of the part-
nership, even at the expense of his fiduciary obligations ;.2 and generally
any provision designed to curtail full enjoyment of ownership by the do-
nee. Although the presence of any one of these undesirable provisions
112. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (a) and (b) (1956).
113. For suggestions in creating the trust and in drafting the trust instrument, see
Jessup, How to Draft the Partnership Agreement and Trust Provisions for a Family
Partnership With Trusts as Partners, 1956 So. CAL. TAX INST. 137; Bennion, How to
Split Income Through Family Partnerships, P-H TAX IDEAS REP. IflI 13003, 13003.4(4).
114. Swinerton v. Smyth, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
115. Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Charles M.
Peisner, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 405 (1957).
116. Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957). However, the
court in Swinerton v. Smyth, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961) states that
continued investment of trust corpus in the partnership business is not an indication of
retained control since the business continued to be profitable.
A provision giving a trustee power to completely refuse to invest in the partnership
is usually only practical where a grantor transfers non-partnership property. In the
case where a grantor transfers a partnership interest it is meaningless to provide that
the trustee can refuse to invest it in the partnership since it is already invested therein.
117. See Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Swinerton v.
Smyth, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
118. See Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958); Ray R. Of ford, 30 P-H Tax Ct.
Memo 871 (1961).
119. See Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958); Swinerton v. Smyth, 7 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
120. Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958).
121. Ibid.
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is not necessarily fatal to recognition, they should b.! avoided so far as is
possible. It should be remembered, however, that even though a trust
instrument contains only the most proper provisions, it will be given
little weight if the provisions are disregarded in the actual conduct of the
partnership business.
Aside from the provisions of the trust instrument and the factors
associated with selection of a trustee, other factors have been considered
particularly significant in trust situations. Actual distribution of all or
a substantial portion of the trust's share of partnership income by the
trustee to the trust beneficiary is persuasive evidence of the bona fides
of a trustee's interest.' Formalistic and other documentary evidence,
such as the filing of fiduciary returns reflecting the trust's share of in-
come, 23 though less persuasive than distribution of income, may be con-
sidered as indicative of real ownership in the trustee. Obviously, any
evidence tending to show that the grantor does not control the use or
investment of trust corpus or income is also a strong indication that the
trustee is the real owner of the interest purportedly transferred. Actual
investment of part of the trust corpus outside of the partnership would
be such evidence.124 However, distributions of trust income or corpus
which are applied to the grantor's benefit, such as payment of family
expenses for which the grantor is legally responsible, tend to show reten-
tion by the grantor of substantial ownership of the interest allegedly
transferred.' -
Completely apart from family partnership considerations, the crea-
tion of a trust for the benefit of a member of the grantor's immediate
family raises the possibility that the trust's income will be taxed to the
grantor under the Clifford principles.'26 Thus, it is also necessary when
contemplating use of a trust to adhere closely to the so-called "Clifford
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956); Swinertun v. Smyth, 7 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 923 (N.D. Cal. 1961). While actual distribution of trust corpus or income
to a beneficiary is strong evidence that the grantor has relin4uished ownership of the
trust property, absence of distributions to the beneficiary doe., not lead to the opposite
inference. Since children are commonly too immature to handle funds for their own
use, it is a customary fiduciary power for a trustee to accumtlate income for the bene-
ficiary. This power could be exercised either in accordance wi{th provisions of the trust
instrument or in carrying out general fiduciary obligations.
123. Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962).
124. See note 115, supra.
125. Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962). The use of trust
corpus or income for items of support is considered a use for the parent's benefit. Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (viii) (1956). "Support extends beyond the bare essentials of
food, clothing, and shelter. It includes elements of education and training commensurate
with the parent's financial ability to provide them." Pflugradt v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 379, 384 (E.D. Wis. 1962). Cf. McKay v. Commissiorer, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960);
Rivers v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 935 (1960).
126. See note 44 supra.
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regulations" in establishing the trust."'
D. Family Partnerships with Limited Partners.
A donee of a limited partnership interest may also be recognized for
income tax purposes as a partner in a family partnership.'28 Two charac-
teristics of the normal limited partnership make it a potentially useful de-
vice, especially where minor children or trustees are made partners:
(1) limited partners have limited liability, and (2) limited partners nor-
mally do not participate in management. 9 In the case where a donor
desires to establish a minor child as a partner directly in a family partner-
ship, the donor will ordinarily be confronted with the minor's lack of
maturity and experience to participate in management of the business.
However, by establishing the minor as a limited partner, no significance
would attach to the absence of management participation, such absence
being a normal characteristic of limited partnership arrangements. In
the case where a partnership interest is transferred in trust, the donor
may be reluctant to give significant management powers to an independ-
ent trustee, and the trustee may be reluctant to become a general partner
with unlimited liability. By making the trustee a limited partner, the
donor may retain management control of the business and the trustee
may enjoy limited liability.
Recognition of the donee of a limited partnership interest as a limited
partner is determined by the same principles that govern recognition of a
general partner; whether dominion and control were acquired over the
partnership interest.' Since the principles governing recognition of a
127. Cf. Apicella v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 979 (1957) (trust denied recognition
under the Clifford doctrine). The Clifford rules, §§ 671-78 of the INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954, generally state that a trust shall be disregarded for income tax purposes
and the income taxed to the grantor if he retains substantial control over the trust
corpus or income, or if the trust corpus or income will return to him in a relatively
short time. While it appears possible that a trust recognizable under § 704(e) might
be disregarded under the Clifford regulations, the reverse may also be possible. In un-
published rulings the Commissioner has indicated that the donor of a family partnership
interest, which constitutes the corpus of a Clifford trust, will remain taxable on the
trust income under the family partnership rules even though he is not taxable under
the Clifford regulations. For a criticism of these rulings, see Herzfeld, Grantor of Fain-
ily Partnership Interest to Clifford Trust is Taxable, I.R.S. Says, 15 J. TAXATION 50
(1961).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.704(e) (ix) (1956) ; see Theodore D. Stern, 15 T.C. 521
(1950) ; Stanback v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1959).
129. 68 C.J.S. Partnerships § 471 (1951) ; "it is fundamental to a limited partner-
ship that the limited partner have no part in the control or management of the business."
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (ix) (1956). Additionally, a limited partnership
is required to be organized and conducted in strict compliance with applicable state law.
See, e.g., Pflugradt v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Wis. 1962). In a
large number of states, the applicable limited partnership law is the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act.
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limited partner are generally the same as those governing recognition of
general partners, it is not surprising that the factors to be considered are
also the same. There are, however, important exceptions. On the one
hand, the Commissioner realizes that no significance can be attributed to
the absence of management participation owing to the nature of the
limited partnership.13' On the other hand, it is recognized that since the
limited partnership device readily lends itself to retention of substantial
controls in the donor, the donor is presented with a tempting opportunity
to render the donee's ownership of an interest more apparent than real.
Accordingly, to insure against abuses in the use of the limited partner-
ship device, the regulations specifically caution that restrictions on the
donee's right to liquidate or transfer his interest, provisions requiring
that the interest remain in the partnership for a long period, and reten-
tion generally by the donor of controls over the donee's interest beyond
those which normally obtain in the light of applicable state law will evi-
dence a lack of real ownership in the donee."'
E. Reallocation of Partnership Income.
Once a family partnership is recognized for income tax purposes,"
the question arises whether the allocation of partnership income provided
by the partnership agreement will be given effect. Prior to 1951, the
general rule was that only the validity or nonvalidity of a family partner-
ship was open to question. Once a family partnership was held valid,
the income-allocation provisions were binding upon the Commissioner. 3 '
The Revenue Act of 1951 abandoned this "all-or-nothing" approach
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2) (ix) (1956): "participation in management by a
donee in a limited partnership is immaterial if the limited partnership meets all the
other requirements prescribed by this paragraph."
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (x) (1956). Where the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act is the applicable law, there is no problem with re3triction on assignment as
§ 19 of the act specifically makes the limited partner's interest assignable.
133. If one or more challenged partners are not recognized for income tax purposes
because the donor remains the substantial owner of the property purportedly transferred,
the tax liability on the income allocable to the purportedly transferred interest will fall
on the donor since he is treated as the owner of the property for income tax purposes.
Non-recognition of challenged partners, in this context, would increase only the donor's
distributive share of partnership income; the distributive shlre of any donee who is
recognized will remain unaffected.
134. The Commissioner contended that he could reallocite partnership income in
proportion to capital and services rendered to the partnership. See I.T. 3845, 1947-1
Cum. BuLL. 66; Mim. No. 6767, 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 111. However, prior to 1951 the
courts generally did not approve this position. See, e.g., Hartz v. Commissioner, 170
F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1948); Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948);
Woolsey v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948) ; but see, Weiss v. Johnson, 206
F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1953) (reallocation endorsed in a proper case).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the case where a partnership interest is created by gift.' Normally,
income will be allocated according to the terms of the partnership agree-
ment, but the Commissioner is now authorized to check abuses in the use
of the family partnership through attempts to deflect income away from
the properly taxable person by improper allocation of partnership in-
come.'36 Deflection of income occurs to the extent that the donee-
partner's share of income does not make allowance for reasonable com-
pensation to the donor for services rendered to the partnership and to
the extent that the portion of the partnership income attributable to the
donee's capital interest is proportionately greater than the portion at-
tributable to the donor's capital interest. 3
Where the Commissioner decides that a proper case exists for dis-
regarding the allocation under partnership agreement, he redetermines an
allocation of income which he feels more reasonably reflects the respec-
tive income-producing contributions of each partner. The Commissioner,
in effect, rewrites the contract between the partners by initially determin-
ing a reasonable allowance for the services rendered by the donor and
then apportioning the balance of the income, if any, to the donor and
donee in accordance with their respective interests in partnership capi-
tal.' In determining a reasonable allowance for services rendered by a
partner, consideration will be given to such criteria as the skill, experi-
ence, and success of the individual in question,'39 the managerial responsi-
bility assumed by the partner, 4 ' compensation normally given for such
135. See Stanback v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1959). While
§ 704(e) (1) provides for recognition as a partner for any person who owns a capital
interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, regard-
less of whether the interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person, §
704(e) (2) limits the Commissioner's authority to reallocate income in disregard of the
provisions of the partnership agreement to cases where the partnership interest is created
by gift. See George A. Paul, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 640 (1957). However, §
704(e) (3) expands the reallocation possibility by treating partnership interests purchased
by one family member from another as if the transaction were a gift. The "family" of
any individual for purposes of § 704(e)(3) includes "only his spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants, and any trusts for the primary benefit of such persons." The re-
allocation provisions also apply in cases where the gift was indirect rather than direct.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (ii) (a) (1956).
136. However, the Code and regulations make it clear that, where a partner has
rendered services to a partnership prior to entering military service, the Commissioner
may not diminish the partner's distributive share because of such absence. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 704(e) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (d) (1956).
137. While § 704(e) (2) speaks only in terms of ensuring a reasonable allowance
for donor's services, the regulations state that a reasonable allowance must also be at-
tributed to the services rendered by the donee. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (b)
(1956).
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (b) (1956).
139. Ralph C. Gorrill, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 910 (1963).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (3) (i) (c) (1956).
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services in similar businesses, 1 ' and the cost of securing equivalent serv-
ices from a person not having an interest in the partnership.4 2 Perhaps
the best evidence of reasonable compensation for any particular services
is evidence of salaries paid to other persons performing similar services
in similar businesses in the same locality.'43 Where the services are ren-
dered by a general partner in a limited family partnership, the Commis-
sioner must also consider, in determining a reasonable compensation, that
a general partner, unlike a limited partner, risks unlimited personal
liability.""
IV. CONCLUSION
The development of the federal income taxation of family partner-
ships reflects the tensions between the efforts of ta~xpayers to distribute
the impact of taxation among close family members without substan-
tially relinquishing control over income-producing property and the at-
tempts of the Commissioner and Congress to insure that income from
personal services will be taxable to the person rendering the services and
income from property will be taxable to the substantial owner of the
property. The decisions prior to 1951 clearly indicate that in the ex-
amination of many family partnerships there was a preoccupation with
their effect on the revenue, rather than with the purpose of determining
whether a real partnership interest had been created in the challenged
partner.
Today family partnership law has emerged from the reigning con-
fusion of the late 1940's. Although there is yet no magic formula for
establishing a family partnership which accomplishes all the objectives
of dollar-conscious taxpayers and also ensures recognition for federal
income tax purposes, the present requirements are more clearly defined
and the judicial treatment is relatively more predictable.
The family partnership device continues to be of value for income
tax purposes and can be safely availed of in the future, provided pru-
dence is exercised and no significant factor, favorable or unfavorable,
is left unconsidered. Great pains should be taken to establish the reality
of ownership of all capital interests and the bona fides of the relation-
141. Ralph C. Gorrill, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 910 (1963) (a study revealed that
normally compensation for the type of services involved ranged from 5-10 per cent of
the gross income of a business).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (c) (1956).
143. See Jelindo A. Tiberti, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 1058 (1962) ; Ralph C. Gorrill,
32 P-H Tax Ct. Memo 910 (1963). The allocation required under § 704(e) (2) may
produce an interesting twist-the Commissioner and the taxpayer will reverse their
traditional positions concerning the adequacy of compensation for personal services.
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (3) (ii) (c) (1956).
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ship in general. Carefully prepared written agreements according due
weight to contributions of capital and service and supported by actual
conduct will go a long way toward accomplishing the desired results.
